This book could be described in a number of ways. First and foremost, it is a study of Sigmund Freud's theory of the unconscious and, in particular, what Freud called his "metapsychology" At the same time, it is a treatment of Jacques Lacan's radical reinterpretation of psychoanalysis, a treatment that seeks both to clarif' key aspects of Lacan's thought and to map its relation to Freud. Then again, it is a work of philosophy that draws new implications from the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious and does so by means of introducing a number of original concepts.
It both is and is not the book I wanted to write. It succeeds in laying out the rudiments of an idea, though not always with the ease and elegance I might have wished for. The idea occurred to me in 1985 in one of those exceptional flashes of insight, vividly intense and absolutely compeiiing, that seem suddenly to penetrate to the heart of a problem. Yet for all its appearance of instantaneous clarity it was an idea that required a great deal of time and labor to articulate. The lightness and transparency of the original inspiration now seem somewhat compromised by the workman-like style with which I have had to unfold it. xlv PREFACE But I remark upon the distance between the conception and execution of my idea less to make apology for my insufficiencies as a writer than to introduce a larger point that is central to this book. For the book is ultimately concerned with the profound tension between simultaneity and succession. It is the tension between the instant flash of insight and the extended time required for its discursive elaboration, the tension between the image and the word. In one sense, everything is present with the first crystallization of the image. As Coleridge recognized, the image is the product of a seemingly magic fusional power. The image is the pregnant source of a virtually inexhaustible stream of realizations. At the same time, however, it is only through the labor of thought mediated by language that an idea, nascent in the body of the image, ripens and truly comes to birth. Only by traversing the pathways of discourse is the mute cargo of the image made available for deliberation.
Upon fürther reflection, this first sense of the relation of image and word, according to which the inchoate potency of the image is unfolded by the word, gives way to a deeper mystery If the germ of the image is brought to fulfillment only by being trellised along the frame of language, it must also be said that language and its formative influence are always already there from the start. Human perception is always preinformed by the categories of speech and language. The seed of the image is sown by the word. Thus this paradox: the universe of language by means of which the human subject struggles to speak itself is at the same time the originary condition without which there could be no subject at all. The house of language is at once the destination of the human journey and also its point of departure.
Freud touched upon this paradox in his concept of Nacbträglichkeit, the term rendered in English as "deferred action" and somewhat more aptly in French as "après coup." By Nacbträglichkeit Freud referred to the wrinkled temporality of human destiny, the circumstance that the human subject is never fully coincident with itself but is always at once behind and ahead of itself. Nachträglithkeit describes the elemental enigma discovered by psychoanalysis: that every seeking of an object of love is an attempt to refind an object that was in fact never possessed. As our discussion unfolds, this paradoxical temporality of retroaction will increasingly emerge at the very center of Freud's theoretical construction, and we will see it related to the master problem of all his work: the complex and dynamic relation of the image and the word. between object love and the narcissistic investment that is constitutive of the ego, the distinction that led him to envisage "a libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out" (SE, 14:75).
So, too, it was the energetic assumption that opened the way to distinguishing between primary and secondary processes in terms of free and bound energies. In his 1915 paper "The Unconscious," Freud reaffirmed the indispensability of energetics, claiming that the distinction between bound and unbound energies "represents the deepest insight we have gained up to the present into the nature of nervous energç and I do not see how we can do without it" (SE, 14:88). Finally, the concept of psychical energy underlay Freud's notion of the instincts or drives and thus formed the foundation of his most daring theoretical construction: the supposition of the two primordial drives of life and death.3 In the theory of the dual drives, the energetic metaphor, far from being left behind as an artifact of an early, exploratory period, comes to occupy the very center of Freud's most mature and farreaching synthesis, according to which the entirety of the psychical process down to its minutest increment is to be reckoned in terms of the two great destinies of energy: the gathering together into ever greater unities under the influence of Eros and the splitting apart and disintegration effected by the death drive.
If the energetic metaphor can thus be seen to undergird virtually the whole of Freud's theor much of its value for psychoanalytic practice consists in the way in which it forms a bridge between theoretical abstraction and immediate lived experience. The metaphor of energy readily renders the phenomenology of bodily experience by situating the body in a field of interacting quantities of force. It resonates with the daily cycle of morning freshness and evening fatigue, for example, and corresponds to our immediately convincing sense of being at times infused with a feeling of power and readiness for activity while at other times we are overwhelmed by a sluggish inertia, at a loss for the resources to take up even the most trivial tasks. On the level of the most immediately given sense of embodiment, the body is unreflectively experienced in terms of the ease and difficulty of its move-ments, while the surrounding world of things is encountered first of all as allowing and facilitating movement or of resisting and frustrating it.
If the concept of psychic energy readily lends itself to accounts of bodily experience, even more striking is its aptness to describe the affective states with which psychoanalysis is typically confronted. In anxiety, for example, the psychoanalytic affect par excellence, we seem to perceive the effects of a pent-up quantity of force vainly in search of release. So, too, mania and dementia suggest the presence of an intense and chaotic overcharge of energy, In like fashion, it is tempting to characterize the behavior of the hysteric in terms of an excessive charge spread over the entire surface of the personality, as if to compensate for an internal lack or vacuity, The compulsive repetitions of the obsessive, on the other hand, are readily conceived as an excessively intense focus of energy, comparable in some way to a tightly coiled eddy in the flow of experience. Precisely the opposite impression is invited by depression, in which the listless and apathetic subject seems empty and, as the word itself suggests, deflated or depressurized.
Despite its theoretical centrality and its clinical relevance, however, If Lacan offers an especially promising path of "return to Freud,» it is by no means an easy path to follow. In the first place there is the notori- expression, the bewildering, the illuminating, the most exalted and the most contemptible, the pulsating stream of light, or the deceitful flow from the heart of an impenetrable darkness.'5
For many people otherwise interested in knowing what Lacan is up to, the torture of ploughing through his prose is too high a price to be paid. Arid indeed, Lacan often gives the maddening impression that he intentionally resists being understood. "I like to leave the reader no other way out than the way in,' he says, "which I prefer to be difficult' (E:S, 146). One advantage of this choice is to prevent too easy a reading. As Lacan sees it, the masterfully lucid prose form by which Freud sought to make himself understandable, even to a lay audience, paradoxically contributed to widespread misunderstandings of his thought. The possibilities for distortion are multiplied to the extent that many of Freud's concepts appear assimilable to commonsense notions. The activity of repression, for example, is all too easily imagined as a mechanical process analogous to hiding something away in a box or cupboardan image that, however wildly inadequate to the complexity of the psychical process Freud has in mind, is at times called up by Freud's own manner of speaking. Or again, the relation of the ego to the id and superego is too readily reduced to a conflict between the claims of base animality and duty to a higher nature. Pressed into this mold, Freud's discovery is trimmed to fit the Sunday school banality of a weak but well-intentioned self torn between its devil and its angel. The attractiveness of such notions derives precisely from their immense crudity a circumstance that would concern us less were it not for the frequency with which they can be discerned not only in the vulgar reception of Freud's theories but also in discussions by people who ought to know better. Lacan's punishing style ups the ante for achieving a more sophisticated understanding io by first denying us such comfortable oversimplifications. As he puts it himsell; Lacan "provides an obstacle to the experience of analysis being served up to you in a completely cretinous way."16 The difficulty of Lacan's prose frustrates the flat-headed certainties of commonsense and helps restore the note of utter strangeness and even violence to common sense that is an essential feature of the Freudian perspective.
But there is more to it than that. The insistent obscurity of Lacan's style is intended not only to break old habits of thought but also to establish new ones. In the opacity of his own discourse, Lacan aims to produce in the reader an experience that bears some likeness to the analytic encounter with the unconscious. His style is an appropriate reflection of the fact, as he says, that "obscurity is characteristic of our field" (FFC, 187 The difficuities posed by Lacan's style are compounded by the fact that he rereads Freud's theory by reference to a battery of highly original concepts that are unfamiliar to traditional students of psychoanalysis.
symbolic, Lacan draws upon the structuralist conception of language as a diacritical system in an effort to provide a new understanding of the nature and destiny of unconscious desire, that of "the unconscious structured like a language." The claim is a provocative one, yet it becomes increasingly plausible when we reread Freud's great case studies with an eye to the way in which the workings of the unconscious are revealed over and again to turn around plays on words and phonemic linkages. As a grand system of differences, the structure of language comprises an immense and precisely articulated web, impossible of perceptual representation, in which the desire of the subject unknown to the ego finds its circuit toward expression.
The first two registers of imaginary and symbolic are triangulated by a third, that of the real, by which Lacan points enigmatically toward an unencompassable horizon that remains unthinkable and unknowable. The real forever outstrips everything figured by the imaginary or signified by the symbolic. As much an expression of the ineffable ground of the subject's own being as that of the world beyond it, the real escapes all representation, even as its indeterminate force may be encountered in the experience of the uncanny or evidenced in the effects of the trauma.
Lacan's innovative categories, particularly his conception of the imaginary ego, serve to mark a sharp departure from the prevailing interpretation of Freud's theory, especially in the United States, informed by "ego psychology" Given its initial impetus by Anna Freud and developed by Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, Rudolph Lowenstein, and others, ego psychology conceives the primary task of psychic life to be adaptation to reality The accomplishment of this task falls upon the executive ego, whose powers of synthesis and defense enable it to mediate the three-way conffict between the pressures of instinctual drives emanating from within the organism, the constraints of external reality, and the demands of conscience levied by the superego. For these theorists, the strengthening of the ego and the enlargement of the "conflict-free sphere" over which it holds sway become the primary goals of psychoanalysis.
For Lacan, nothing could be further from the essential aims of analysis. Far from being the key to health and happiness, the ego from a Lacanian viewpoint is the heart of the problem. "The ego," Lacan argues, "is structured exactly like a symptom. At the heart of the subject, ¡t is only a privileged symptom, the human symptom par excellence, the mental illness of man" (E:S, 16). In Lacan's view, it is the imaginary character of the ego that is decisive. Although the elaboration of psychic structure must necessarily pass through the formation of an ego, the imaginary institution of the ego is stabilized only at the price of a profound alienation of the subject from its own desire. 
